

Dossymova M.K. 
Abai Kazakh National Pedagogical University
mugazimad@gmail.com

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY OF BREST-LITOVSK IN EASTERN ANATOLIA

Abstract. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed on March 3, 1918, is an important diplomatic document that ended the Caucasus Front of World War I between the Ottoman Empire and Soviet Russia, and introduced new border arrangements between the parties. One of the most notable articles of the treaty stipulated the return of the cities of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum to the Ottoman Empire, which had been ceded to Russia following the Treaty of Berlin signed after the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War. The implementation process of the treaty in Eastern Anatolia was not merely a diplomatic border arrangement, but also brought about multidimensional developments such as military operations, administrative organization, and the reintegration of the region's population into Ottoman rule. During the March-April 1918 period, the Ottoman army advanced in the Caucasus and effectively took possession of the territories specified within the framework of the treaty provisions. During this process, tensions with the Armenian population in the region, migration movements, and local resistance were also among the notable events. The implementation of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was considered both a military and political gain for the Ottoman Empire, but the permanence of these gains was limited. With the Ottoman Empire's defeat in World War I at the end of the same year and the signing of the Armistice of Mudros, the regions in question quickly fell out of Ottoman control once again. Therefore, the implementation of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in Eastern Anatolia represents a temporary but strategically important period in Ottoman history.

Keywords: Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Three Sanjaks (Kars, Ardahan, Batumi), Caucasus, Ottoman Empire, Russian Empire, Armenians, Greeks, Soviet Russia.

Introduction

The Bolshevik Revolution that took place in Russia in 1917 profoundly affected not only the political balance of Eastern Europe but also the power dynamics along the eastern borders of the Ottoman Empire. The Bolshevik administration that came to power after the revolution considered the continuation of the war as one of the main causes of both internal political instability and economic collapse; therefore, the central government initiated peace negotiations with the Central Powers, including the Ottoman Empire. As a result of this process, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk signed on March 3, 1918, led to the closure of the eastern front of the First World War and produced multifaceted political and military consequences, particularly in the Caucasus and Eastern Anatolia regions.

Under the terms of the treaty, Russia agreed to return the regions of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum to the Ottoman Empire, which had been lost following the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War through the Treaty of Berlin; however, issues such as the termination of Russian military presence in the region, the future of national movements in the Caucasus, and the status of local administrations created a new field of geopolitical debate. Therefore, Brest-Litovsk was not merely a peace text but also a document that reshaped the Ottoman Empire's strategic objectives in Eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus.

The implementation process of the treaty was not easy due to the complex military and political conditions on the ground. The Bolshevik administration's decision to withdraw created a power vacuum in the Caucasus, which accelerated the independence initiatives of Georgian,

Armenian, and Azerbaijani national councils. In particular, conflicts between the Armenian National Council and the Ottoman army significantly complicated the implementation of the Brest-Litovsk provisions in Eastern Anatolia. Military operations launched by the Ottoman Empire to implement the treaty articles directly affected the demographic structure, security conditions, and local administrative arrangements in the region.

In this context, the implementation of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in Eastern Anatolia is a multidimensional issue that should be examined not only in terms of diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and Soviet Russia but also in terms of the transformation of ethnic movements, border arrangements, and international power balances in the region. The aim of this study is to evaluate, within an academic framework and in light of historical sources, the process of the treaty's entry into force, the Ottoman Empire's political and military strategies in Eastern Anatolia, the position of local actors, and the regional consequences of its implementation.

Research materials and methods

In the preparation of this article, various sources and studies were used that directly or indirectly addressed issues related to the implementation of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty in Eastern Anatolia and the accompanying military-political processes in the region. The research material included both official documents from the period of 1917-1918 (treaties, diplomatic correspondence, command reports, negotiation protocols), as well as works by domestic and foreign researchers devoted to international relations, the political history of the Caucasus, and military events of the First World War.

In the analysis process, factor analysis was primarily used, which allowed for the identification of groups of factors (military-political, geostrategic, ethno-social, and ideological) that influenced the implementation of treaty provisions in Eastern Anatolia. The application of this method helped to reveal the main determinants that defined the behavior of key regional actors—the Ottoman Empire, Soviet Russia, local national councils, and Armenian armed formations.

Secondly, textual analysis was applied to study the content of memoir literature, military-historical reports, newspaper publications, and political declarations of that time. Special attention was paid to works created by direct participants or contemporaries of the events under consideration, which allows for establishing the ideological positions of the authors, the degree of their involvement in political processes, as well as identifying the specifics of assessments of the implementation of the Brest-Litovsk agreements and their consequences for Eastern Anatolia.

Discussion

The implementation issues of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty in Eastern Anatolia have received fairly extensive but fragmented coverage in modern historiography. Researchers from both Turkey and foreign countries pay attention to specific aspects of the political, military, and diplomatic processes of 1917-1918; however, a comprehensive analysis of the treaty's consequences for Eastern Anatolia is not observed in most works.

S. Yerasimos made a significant contribution to studying the context of the period in his fundamental research “Turkish-Soviet Relations in the War of Independence 1917-1923,” which examines the interaction between Turkey and Soviet Russia during the transformation of the international system (Yerasimos, 2000). Although the author analyzes the evolution of bilateral relations, the issues of direct implementation of the Brest-Litovsk agreements in Eastern Anatolia are addressed only fragmentarily. The main emphasis is placed on political and diplomatic contacts, but not on regional specifics and local consequences.

Publications on the history of the Turkish Revolution and the liberation struggle also note the significance of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty for closing the Caucasian front; however, the emphasis shifts primarily to the general military situation rather than the administrative or demographic specifics of the region (Turkish Revolution History, 1972). Similarly, materials from “Turkish War

in the First World War. Caucasus Front” (1978) provide a detailed description of operations in 1916-1918, which allows for the reconstruction of the military situation but does not provide an in-depth analysis of the political and legal mechanisms for implementing the treaty locally.

Research devoted to the Caucasus in 1918 deserves special attention. For instance, M. Sarı, in the article “The Istanbul Journey of Caucasian Delegates and the Caucasus Front (1918),” examines the activities of Caucasian delegations and the dynamics of political struggle in Transcaucasia (Sarı, 2016). The author identifies the positions of Azerbaijani, Georgian, and Armenian national councils, which allows for a better understanding of the complexity of the regional situation during the implementation of the Brest-Litovsk agreements. However, Ottoman policy in Eastern Anatolia itself is analyzed indirectly, within the framework of the general context of Caucasian processes.

Valuable information is contained in the works of A. E. Gokdemir on the South-Western Caucasus government (Gokdemir, 1989), which allow for an assessment of political transformations in disputed territories. However, here too, the main attention is paid to the state-legal formation of regional structures, while the issues of practical implementation of the treaty conditions remain secondary.

Personal sources, especially the memoirs of Kazım Karabekir, present extremely important material for reconstructing events (Karabekir, 1994; Kazım, 1990). Karabekir, being one of the key participants in military operations in Eastern Anatolia, describes the retreat of Russian troops, the resistance of Armenian armed forces, and the actions of the Ottoman army in the process of reclaiming Kars, Ardahan, and Batum. However

Research Results

Implementation of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. After the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, based on the agreement recognizing the sovereignty of Elviye-i Selase in the hands of the Ottoman Empire, Vehip Pasha, on March 10, requested the Transcaucasian Government to withdraw along the border, evacuating Eastern Anatolia under occupation, as per the fourth article concerning Elviye-i Selase. However, the Chairman of the Transcaucasian Constituent Assembly demanded the signing of a new treaty based on the pre-war 1914 borders, stating that they did not recognize the Soviet Government and its implemented agreements without the Transcaucasian Government being recognized as a legal entity. Meanwhile, the Ottoman Empire declared that since it did not legally recognize the existence of the Transcaucasian Government, there was only one legal entity, the Soviet Government, and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (Yerasimos, Stefanos., 2000:21).

On April 6, 1918, Rauf Bey sent an ultimatum to the Caucasian Delegation, demanding the recognition of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and that the Transcaucasian Government definitively declare its independence from Russia as a sovereign state (Turkish Revolution History, 1972:187).

The Caucasian government's opposition to the return of Elviye-i Selase to the Ottoman Empire during the Brest-Litovsk agreement is described in Omer Faik Bey's letter to Talat Pasha and Enver Pasha as follows: On February 5th, by opening the Constituent Assembly in Tiflis, consisting of Muslims, Armenians, and Georgians, the Caucasus separated from the Bolshevik government, and therefore the Caucasian Government only existed in name. During this period, he states that the Muslim, Armenian, and Georgian provinces were governed through their own committees; Baku and Ganja were entirely, and Kars, Yerevan, and Batumi were partially in Turkish hands, while other parts of Kars and Yerevan were in Armenian hands, and the remaining part of Batumi was in the hands of Christian Georgians. He also explains that although the Caucasian Government requested a month for peace negotiations, their actual intention was to form army corps and divisions from Armenians, Georgians, Greeks, Ossetians, and Caucasian Russians, send them to the border, and thus influence the peace negotiations (Sarı, Mustafa., 2016:85).

Although the Caucasus Government was not legally recognized, the reason they responded to the Ottoman Empire by not recognizing Soviet Russia and the Brest-Litovsk agreement was as follows: More than a hundred British and French officers and engineers were working in Tbilisi.

Their aim was to keep Ottoman forces at the Caucasian borders and to capture the Armenians between Baghdad and Van, thus gaining control over the entire Caucasus region. For this purpose, the British were convincing the Caucasus government and Caucasian delegates that there were no large forces on the Ottoman border and that it would be very easy to protect the border (Sarı, Mustafa, 2016:86).

Thus, in the authority vacuum, the English were implementing their intention to establish a greater Armenia by using Caucasian Muslims through the Caucasian government.

While discussions were taking place among British, French, and German officials regarding the Caucasian government, the Ottoman government began to implement the fourth article of the Brest-Litovsk agreement.

Vehip Pasha ordered the Army Commanders who came to liberate Elviye-i Selâse (Three Provinces) to “treat people with compassion and justice; avoid violating property, life, honor, and dignity; refrain from touching places of worship, schools, and libraries; not to commit any harmful acts against the people of Armenian villages and towns that would be left behind the army, and to treat them well in a manner befitting the glory of the Turkish nation” (Turkish War..., 1978:473).

The Ottoman Empire, implementing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, began its liberation operations with the Turkish Army on March 11. Erzurum, which had fallen on February 6, 1916, was recaptured on March 12, 1918, by the 1st Corps Commander Kazım Karabekir's Headquarters, and the 1914 border was reached (Gokdemir, Ahmet Ender, 2000:19-20). In this period, the forces initiated by the 3rd Army Commander Vehip Pasha to liberate the Three Provinces (Elviye-i Selâse) captured Sarıkamış on April 5, liberated Ardahan on April 6, and advanced towards Batum, crossing the old borders. Between April 7 and 26, they captured Kars and Batum. Thus, Turkish forces reached the 1877 border and destroyed the British dream of establishing a large Armenian state (Yerasimos, Stefanos., 1989:18).

The Armenian Issue. Armenians, who sometimes sided with the Byzantines against the Sasanians, had been under pressure from the two countries that struggled as long as they lived there. The Greeks had tried to forcibly Hellenize the Armenians. Due to the political difficulties of Catholic and Orthodox Greeks, along with religious attacks and heavy taxes, they lived in unrest and deprivation. This situation continued until Anatolia came under Turkish rule. With the beginning of Turkish rule in Anatolia, the Armenians who came under Seljuk rule began to live in comfort and peace (Alpargu, Mehmet- Ozcelik, İsmail- Yavuz, 2001:181).

After the Seljuks, Armenians lived in peace and comfort under the just and tolerant policy of the Ottoman Empire, which had emerged on the historical stage. The Ottoman Empire had provided personal and property security for every Christian nation. Although living in a great Turkish state, the non-Muslim populations under Ottoman rule, including Jews, Armenians, and Greeks, continued their existence under the administration of their own religious leaders, subject to certain conditions. The Turks respected the languages, places of worship (monasteries), educational environments, historical studies, political institutions (foundations that could carry out cultural activities), and local organizations of each non-Muslim nation, thus maintaining the existence of the non-Muslim population (Jews, Armenians, and Greeks). Moreover, non-Muslims were not even conscripted into the military. They engaged in industry and craftsmanship. As a result, by conducting trade, they attained wealth in a very short time (Photographs of the Massacre., 2000:1-2)

Thus, until the last quarter of the 19th century, that is, until Europe made Armenians their brokers in trade after the Greeks living in the Ottoman Empire, Muslims and non-Muslims had always lived in peace and security in Ottoman territories.

Essentially, the Armenian issue emerged when the Russian Empire intended to realize its dreams of reaching warm waters and seizing the straits as the Ottoman Empire weakened. It began with the Russians inciting Armenians against Turks while benefiting from Armenians during the Ottoman-Russian war of 1877-1878. The Russians, thinking they could achieve their goals by capturing the Three Provinces (Elviye-i Selase), provoked all Armenians living there. Thus, Russia

became the first state to raise the Armenian Question in the Ottoman Empire (Photographs of the Massacre., 2000:13-14).

In the plan to implement the Russian Empire's policy of expanding southward, there was an intention to fragment the Ottoman Empire by inciting non-Muslim populations living under Ottoman protection to revolt against the Turks.

In 1723-1724, the Russian Tsar Peter also drew Armenian and Georgian communities living in the Caucasus into trade agreements, similar to European dominance. Moreover, Peter agreed to educate the children of prominent figures from both communities. Thus, he made separate agreements with the communities of both groups. According to this agreement, he also promised to protect the two communities against the Ottoman and Iranian states. It is known that the Armenian and Georgian children taken by the Russians for education remained as officers in the Russian army over time. These officers were also used as agents in the Ottoman Empire. Armenian officers trained in Russia and Europe had formed Armenian gangs. Russia had even promoted the Armenians it trained to the rank of general. Russia's main purpose was to establish an Armenia under Russian control, extending from Eastern Anatolia to Basra or Çukurova (Saray, Mehmet, 1998:163-166). The Russian Empire spent 50 out of 241 years between 1677 and 1918 at war to destroy the Ottoman Empire. Realizing that warfare alone would not be sufficient to bring down the Ottoman State, the Tsardom employed spies and played various games. Regarding the Russian Tsardom's schemes, Karl Marx wrote in the "New York Tribune" newspaper in 1855, "We are certainly not unaware that before every war, hundreds of Russian agents worked in every corner of the Ottoman Empire under the guise of Orthodoxy and Slavic brotherhood, and that Russian gold played a particularly significant role in stimulating dissolution" (Kırımer, Cafer Seydahmet, 1948:8).

Thus, the Russians cultivated formidable individuals from among the Armenians to use against the Turks. The Armenians were divided into two groups. One group dreamed of establishing an Armenian State under Russian mandate, while the other group imagined creating Armenia under British mandate. With this purpose, Armenians, relying on the support of these two powers, had instigated rebellions everywhere in the Ottoman Empire. They had killed hundreds of thousands of Turks.

During World War I, Armenians collaborating with Russians and British had begun to betray the Ottoman Empire. With the dream of establishing an independent state in Ottoman territories they considered their own, Armenians had sided with Russia during World War I to weaken the Ottoman Empire. Thus, starting with Russia, the Allied Powers had distributed weapons and ammunition to Armenian gangs from 1914 onwards to attack the Turkish army from behind. Armenians remaining behind the front lines had engaged in massacres against Turks, regardless of whether they were women, children, elderly, or young, and were determined to continue their brutality until they liberated the Three Provinces (Elviye-i Selâse).

When Kazım Karabekir Pasha came to liberate Erzurum, he described what he saw as follows: "While we were feeling sorrow seeing what was inside Erzurum with our own eyes, we were in utter anguish hearing the news coming from around. Erzurum Railway Station was like a graveyard that had thrown its dead out of their graves. We saw that two opposing stone buildings were filled with burned Turkish corpses after a fire. The castle dungeons at Kars Gate were full of massacred civilians. In the villages of Umudun Sitavuk and Arzuti to the north of Erzurum, almost no one was left. During the battles in this last village, Dashnaks appeared in the guise of Muslim women in chadors to the reconnaissance team sent from the 13th Regiment, even welcoming them by clapping hands, and thus ambushing these poor souls from close range, wounding three of our soldiers" (Karabekir, Kazım, 1994:12).

The Armenian and Greek gangs that withdrew from Erzurum first went to Kars and then to Sarıkamış. After the Armenians left, Sarıkamış presented a majestic yet desolate scene, with fires

everywhere, high smoke, and a great emptiness. The Armenians had carried out terrible massacres in 28 villages around Kars (Karabekir, Kazım, 1994:54).

After the Russians occupied Sarıkamış during World War I, the Armenians left no stone unturned in their mistreatment of the Turks. On May 11, 1918, they tortured and killed 12,000 Turks. It is said that a mass grave where Turks were buried has been found in the vicinity recently. In Yanık Dere, east of Erzurum, Armenians massacred 3,000 Turks in a single night (Photographs of the Massacre, 2000:32).

A Russian Captain describes an event that Armenians carried out for entertainment at the Third Army Command in Erzincan as follows: “The Armenians gathered Muslims saying they would make them work in Sarıkamış, but after moving two kilometers away from the city, they martyred them. He mentions hearing from Armenians that if there weren't Russian officers among the Armenians, the atrocities would have been even worse, and that in one night, eight hundred Muslims were slaughtered”. In fact, in their conversations, the Armenians had said, “We completely slaughtered the people of Erzurum and its surroundings, and we will do the same here” (Photographs of the Massacre, 2000:42-46).

Armenian gangs burned down and destroyed the villages of Cins, Beirut, Mamahatun (Tercan), Tezegul, and Alacakoy between Erzincan and Erzurum, committing a large-scale massacre. Kazım Karabekir Pasha, Commander of the 1st Caucasus Corps, stated that as they advanced to liberate Erzurum, due to the great atrocities committed by the Armenians, “the smell of blood and fire” was coming from everywhere (Karabekir, Kazım, 1990:113).

While retreating towards Gyumri, the Armenians killed more than two hundred men, women, and children in the village's barns. From there, they withdrew to the Pazarcık region, then passed through Digor and set out towards Yerevan via Arpaçay near the village of Hacıbayram. It is known that they also carried out massacres against the Turks east of Arpaçay (Karabekir, Kazım, 1990:347).

Meanwhile, Armenians had initiated the genocide against Muslim Turks in the early years of the war. Armenians who established the Hunchak and Dashnak organizations attempted to establish their independence through terrorism. Armenians in Turkish territories were to establish an independent Armenian State in Eastern Anatolia with the intervention and assistance of Russians and Allied Powers. In the meantime, the Russians had promised that the lands to be taken from the Ottoman Empire would be left to the Armenians (Photographs of the Massacre, 2000:4).

A telegram received from Van Province on December 2, 1914, describes the general situation in the city. The telegram states: “The Armenians in the provincial center and other areas are currently maintaining their calm. However, all Armenians in the Salmas region are acting in conjunction with the Russians. The gangs at the border are commanded by Armenians Andranik and his associates, who were previously responsible for the Talori rebellion. During and after the Hanik battle, there are Armenians who have deserted and joined the enemy” (Photographs of the Massacre, 2000:4). Thus, with the weapons and financial aid provided by Russia and Europe, Armenians initiated a brutal massacre against the Turks. Following the outbreak of World War, I, Armenians revolted in Van, massacring Turks in the surrounding area and attempting to declare their independence in the region.

In Captain İsmail İshak's memoirs, the loyalty of Armenians to the Russian army began before October 3, 1915. For instance, an Armenian named Şipak had cut telegraph wires several times to assist the Russian army.

Armenians from Kayseri, dressed in Russian military uniforms, attacked alongside Russian soldiers and even committed atrocities that the Russian soldiers themselves did not. For example, they killed children, women, and men in occupied areas. He explained that their evil acts in the

borders of Eleşkirt and Bayezid, and in the directions of Muş and Van, were beyond human comprehension”² (Photographs of the Massacre, 2000:35).

By implementing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Allied Powers, violating the Armistice of Mudros, had demanded the withdrawal of Turkish forces from the areas evacuated by the Turkish Army. According to Article 11 of the Armistice of Mudros, these places should have actually remained under Turkish control. The British had demanded the immediate evacuation of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum (Alpargu, Mehmet- Ozcelik, İsmail- Yavuz, 2001:105).

By occupying Turkish lands, the Allied Powers had played unimaginable games on Turkey, attempting to eradicate the Turkish nation from Turkish soil. The oppression inflicted by Armenians on the Turkish people in Eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus, and the future of the Turkish people who suffered persecution from Greeks, Rums, and other Christian nations in their own lands, greatly concerned Mustafa Kemal. Stating that “History can never deny the existence of a nation”, Mustafa Kemal invited the entire Turkish nation to unite in defending their homeland (Photographs of the Massacre, 2000:23).

Conclusion

Turkish and Soviet Russian Governments After the War. Russia, which participated in World War I, was plunged into great poverty and misery after the war. It remained in the war until the end with the aim of gaining new territories. However, the years 1916-1917 were very difficult for the Russian people, with hunger and poverty affecting the entire Russian population. As a result, in 1917, the Tsarist regime was overthrown and replaced by the Soviet Union. However, even though the Bolsheviks took control of the Russian administration, they were unwilling to return the occupied Turkish territories, continuing the policy of the Russian Tsardom. To maintain control over the Eastern provinces occupied by the Russian Tsardom, Soviet Russia adopted a “decree” pertaining to Armenia on December 29, 1917 - January 11, 1918, providing Armenians with the opportunity to immediately establish military and civilian organizations. They openly communicated this by sending a telegram to the Turkish delegation in Brest-Litovsk. Ahmet Nesimi, on behalf of Turkey, sent a counter-protest stating, “Arming the population of a country that does not belong to Russia (i.e., on Turkish territory) and compelling them to declare independence is not in line with the aims and principles put forward by the Russian revolution and defended and explained by the Russian delegates” (Kurat, Akdes Nimet, 1990:370-371).

As Ahmet Nesimi stated, “The Soviet administrators who entered into peace negotiations with Turkey and its allies were clearly resorting to an extra-agreement policy (against Turkey) by organizing the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia in this manner...” It has been said that the entire problem in the Caucasus was under the command of Soviet Russia³ (Kurat, Akdes Nimet, 1990:372).

Thus, as soon as the Soviets came to power, they wanted to continue the dream of establishing a large Armenian state in Eastern Anatolia, which would be under the mandate of the Russian Tsardom, and we know from history that they also intended to spread the Bolshevik revolution throughout the world. The Russians even said, “We will be the first nation to realize the world revolution”. Regarding Russian Bolshevism, Nikolai Berdyaev states, “Bolshevism is not an episode or a separate incident in Russian history, but an organic, structural disease of the Russian people” (Kırımer, Cafer Seydahmet, 1948:5).

After the conclusion of peace, Soviet Russia intended to incite a Bolshevik revolution in Germany and Austria-Hungary. In response, Germany attempted to prevent the Bolshevik threat by

² From the Russian soldier's account. Photographs of the Massacre of Turks by Armenians During World War I, Library of the General Staff Attaché Presidency. Ankara 2000, p. 81.

³ The Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissar Leon Trotsky, in order to intimidate Ahmet Nesimi Bey, said these words: “The Russian Army in the Caucasus is entirely under the control of the Soviet government” Kurat, Akdes Nimet, Turkey and Russia. Ministry of Culture, Ankara 1990, p. 372.

making peace with the Russians and adopting a policy of supporting the Ukrainians (Kurat, Akdes Nimet, 1990:369). Soviet administrators had also tried to influence Turkey with the Bolshevik regime. In fact, Russian documents describe how the Bolshevik regime was very influential and widespread among Turkish youth, stating that after the October Revolution in Russia in 1917, Turkish students made demands with the Bolshevik slogan “Peace, Bread, Armament (universal armament)”. It claims that on April 12, 1918, students held a historic meeting at Istanbul Hamidiye University, where they placed a portrait of Lenin with the inscription “Comrade Lenin, the idol of oppressed nations and the world” in the most prominent place of the university, and unanimously decided to nominate Comrade Lenin for the Nobel Prize⁴ (GARF, Fund 130. Inventory 3. File 176. Sheet 3).

In the same year in February, it is explained that the removal of Lenin's portrait by order of General De Espre, the former director of the university, led to the unification of Turkish youth and ideological workers. The united youth and worker community states that they initiated a call for the Bolshevik regime for the people oppressed in their own lands and suffering under the politics of the Ottoman Empire, through a “knowledge war”. Their first journals were “Military Poor (Военная Беднота)”, “Bolshevik (Большевик)” published in Istanbul, and “Farmer (Крестьянин)” published in Aydın. The journals explain that they were simultaneously calling the Turkish people to a new life and unity by Bolshevik Russian revolutionaries, and that Soviet Russia even provided moral support to the half-dead Turkish people through these journals (GARF, Fund 130. Inventory 3. File 176. Sheet 4). Furthermore, the Soviet administration claims that the “United Executive Committee of Muslim State Revolutionaries” was formed with the participation of officers and prisoners returning from Russia to Turkey, students, workers, Indian Muslims, Egyptian Arabs, and Persian ideological revolutionary members (GARF, Fund 130. Inventory 3. File 176. Sheet 5).

Thus, Soviet administrators made promises with various slogans such as “Land and freedom for farmers, peasants, and workers”, “peace, bread, and justice”, “Freedom”, “Democracy and Republic” to spread Bolshevism. However, it is necessary to see the gap between the Bolsheviks' promises and their actions. For instance, the desire of Russian Bolshevik liberal administrators, who created slogans like “Democracy and Republic”, to capture Istanbul and the Straits had astonished the whole world. In fact, Foreign Minister Milyukov had said, “The change of government did not change our hands. We want to possess Istanbul more than ever because it is essential for our commercial freedom...” (Kırimer, Cafer Seydahmet, 1948:9-10).

We see that history has eventually revealed that Milyukov, by saying these words, meant to imply that the difference between the Russian Tsardom and Soviet Russia was merely a change in government, with the political method remaining the same. Bolshevik Russia, despite the fall of Communism, still keeps secret in its archives how they deceived all people who believed in Bolshevism, all of humanity, with various promises and slogans, what they did, how they did it, and why they did it, as if still behind an iron curtain.

Soviet Russia did not fulfill the legal responsibilities outlined in its first treaty signed with Turkey. In fact, it had oppressed the Turkish people by arming the Armenians in Kars, Ardahan, and Batum. Soviet Russia had declared that the Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani peoples in the Caucasus could determine their own fate. Consequently, Armenians who wanted the Eastern Anatolian provinces to be given to them massacred the local Turkish population. However, in the Brest-Litovsk agreement, they had promised to stop arming Armenian gangs and to halt their assaults and massacres against the local Turks. The Russians not only failed to keep their word again but also tried to establish Georgian and Armenian states under Soviet Russian control in the Caucasus. They secretly rearmed Armenian gangs that were against the Turks. Armenian and Russian gangs supported by the Russians attacked the newly re-established Azerbaijan Democratic

⁴ Comrade Lenin, His Excellency, the idol of oppressed nations and the world (here the text is unclear, read approximately as “new prophet”). Odessa, May 14, 1919. Ata-Baha. (confidential document).

Republic in 1918. Azerbaijan, under attack from Armenian and Russian gangs, requested military aid from Turkey based on Article 4 of the Ottoman-Azerbaijani agreement, which stated, “When requested by the Government of the Azerbaijan Republic, the Ottoman Government will provide armed assistance as deemed necessary to maintain internal order and security”. Upon this request for aid, the Turks entered Baku. This event did not please the Russians (Saray, Mehmet, 1998:182-183).

On April 26, 1918, the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Soviets, Sverdlov, officially received the Turkish Ambassador, Galip Kemal Bey. The head of the Turkish delegation stated, “I am pleased and honored to have come with the task of establishing peaceful and friendly relations between the two neighboring states, and I will work with all my efforts in this direction, and I will be proud to receive sincere help from him and his government”. However, although he knew that the Turks were acting according to the Brest-Litovsk agreement, Sverdlov gave this response: “You speak of friendship, but your armies continue to conduct military operations in the Caucasus. How is this possible? Write to your government to cease actions contrary to friendly relations”. Meanwhile, Galip Kemal also informed that Turkish soldiers were in the region to free the Turks from the oppression of Russian and Armenian gangs (Soylemez, Galip Kemal., 1949:447). Meanwhile, from the moment Galip Kemal arrived, his close contact with the Muslims in Russia and the policy of “Turkism and Islamism” had begun to disturb the Russian administrators. The last Ottoman ambassador also states that he is acting in accordance with Article 11 of the Brest-Litovsk agreement (Turkey's close involvement with Russian Muslims) in response to their discomfort (Kurat, Akdes Nimet, 1990:404).

While the Ottoman Empire intended to reclaim the Three Sanjaks (Elviye-i Selâse) by implementing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Soviet Russia wanted to prevent the return of the Three Sanjaks to the Ottoman Empire. This issue became a significant topic during Chicherin's first meeting with the Turkish ambassador Galip Kemal Bey on April 30, 1918. Chicherin expressed his efforts to establish diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire by explaining that European capitalists aimed to dominate economically weak countries like Russia and Turkey, and that the two governments could assist each other in this matter (Kurat, Akdes Nimet, 1990:411-413).

Following this, on April 27, an article by Mustafa Suphi was published in the “New World” newspaper, the publication of the Moscow Muslim Socialists Central Committee, aimed at spreading Bolshevik ideas to the Ottoman Empire and opposing the Committee of Union and Progress (the Pashas' Government). In response, on May 22, the Turkish ambassador sent a protest to Chicherin, stating that these actions were in violation of the second article of the Brest-Litovsk agreement and demanding their cessation (Yerasimos, Stefanos, 2000:23). On May 23, 1918, from the Soviet Deputy Commissioner of Foreign Affairs L. Karahan to the Ambassador to Moscow, Galip Kemal Bey: “In response to your letter dated the 22nd, in which you complained about the agitation conducted by the Socialist Muslim publication 'New World' newspaper, we would like to express our regret regarding your displeasure with the activities of the Moscow Muslim Socialists Central Committee and its publication, as well as the harsh criticisms this publication directs towards the internal and external policies of the Ottoman Empire. However, it is impossible for us to change the views of Socialist Turks or prevent them from expressing these views.

In this case, Article 2 of the Brest-Litovsk agreement does not apply, because while this article clearly states that the relevant parties will refrain from any kind of incitement against each other's political institutions, it does not in any way restrict freedom of the press in these countries” (Yerasimos, Stefanos, 2000:49).

As we have seen, Russia only verbally expresses its efforts to establish diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire. The issue that greatly concerned Soviet Russia was the situation in the Caucasus. Because in August and September (1918), the Turkish army was advancing deep into the Caucasus.

At this time, the North Caucasus delegates (Turkish National Movements in Dagestan) sent their application to Turkey. North Caucasus was declaring its independence and requested the Ottoman Government to sign a peace agreement. They stated their reason, “Since the day the government in Russia fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks, far from bringing happiness and prosperity to the country as they claimed, it is a well-known fact throughout the world that they have left the former territories of the old empire in blood and fire, and these flames of oppression and confusion have spread to all regions of the North Caucasus as well as Baku and its surroundings in the South Caucasus, and for six months, gangs with intentions of murder and plunder have been continuously swarming in all places where Muslims reside, especially in the province of 'Terek'. Therefore, the safety of life and property of our citizens does not allow time and opportunity to wait for the aforementioned peace agreement to take its official and definitive form, and is directed towards immediately requesting and pleading for military and political assistance from the Supreme Ottoman government...”. Soviet Russia had protested this situation (Yerasimos, Stefanos, 2000:57-58).

Fearing further Turkish advancement, Chicherin had appealed to the Germans through his ambassador in Berlin, Joffe. German Foreign Minister von Kuhlmann told the Soviet ambassador that they could stop the Turks at the Brest-Litovsk border in exchange for oil. Germany even feared that the Ottoman Empire would take over Baku's oil on its own. However, Stalin, not believing this, had even said it could be a ploy. Meanwhile, the Turks on one side and the British on the other were advancing towards Baku. Shaumyan requested help from the Soviets, but Stalin, speaking of trust in him, was not sending aid (Yerasimos, Stefanos, 2000:57-28-30). Baku was of great importance for the Turks as the gateway to Turkestan. In a letter, Galip Kemal Bey requests the immediate capture of Baku, which he refers to as the first gate to Turkestan. Baku was captured by the Turks on September 15, 1918. From there, immediate military support was provided to the North Caucasian Republic (Keykurun, Naki, 1998:87). Meanwhile, with the signing of the Armistice of Mudros, according to the fifteenth article, Baku must be left to the British. As per the first article of the Armistice of Mudros, the British deployed their fleet to the Black Sea, and on November 13, the Allied Powers' warships set sail towards Batum. Thus, the Black Sea coasts of Soviet Russia were exposed to danger. The British had supported the leaders of the White Army in the Northeast Black Sea Don-Kuban region, Commander Admiral Kolchak and General Denikin, with weapons, ammunition, and money. Soon after, French administrators landed troops in Odessa to support the Ukrainian government against the Bolshevik Red soldiers. Although there was no agreement between the Turks and the British, the British are demanding the surrender of Baku. The Turks were forced to withdraw, handing over Baku to its rightful owner, the Republic of Azerbaijan (Kurat, Akdes Nimet, 1990:585-586).

Thus, when the Allied Powers carried out the occupation of Istanbul in November after the Armistice of Mudros, the Caucasus movement had also begun simultaneously. Consequently, the struggle and relations between Moscow and the Ottoman Empire over the Caucasian territories had come to an end.

References:

- Alpargu..., 2001 – *Mehmet Alpargu*, İsmail Özcelik - Yavuz, Nuri. Ataturk's Principles and History of Turkish Revolution, Gunduz Education Publishing (Umit Printing), Ankara 2001. 302 p. (in Turk).
- GARF, Fund 130. Inventory 3. File 176. Sheet 3. (in Rus).
- GARF, Fund 130. Inventory 3. File 176. Sheet 4. (in Rus).
- GARF, Fund 130. Inventory 3. File 176. Sheet 5. (in Rus).
- Gokdemir, 1989 – *Gokdemir Ahmet Ender*. The South-Western Caucasus Government. Turkish Cultural Research Institute, Ankara 1989. 239 p. (in Tur).

Karabekir, 1994 – *Kazım Karabekir*. How We Managed the First World War, Sarıkamış, Kars and Beyond, Volume IV, Emre Publications, Istanbul 1994. 380 p. (in Turk).

Kazım..., 1990 – Kazım, The Liberation of the East from the Pen of Kazım Karabekir, Erzurum Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Erzurum 1990. 526 p. (in Turk).

Keykurun, 1998 – *Naki Keykurun*. Memories from the Azerbaijani Independence Struggle (1905-1920) (Director General of National Security of the Republic of Azerbaijan), İlke Bookstore Publications, Ankara 1998. 217 p. (in Turk).

Kırimer, 1948 – *Cafer Seydahmet Kırimer*. The Drift of Russian History Towards Revolution, Bolshevism, and World Revolution (Conferences given at Community Centers in Istanbul, Eminonu, Ankara, Zonguldak, at the Zonguldak Mining Technical School, and in Karabuk). Pulhan Printing House, Istanbul 1948. 98 p. (in Turk).

Kurat, 1990 – *Akdes Nimet Kurat*. Turkey and Russia. Ministry of Culture, Ankara 1990. 754 p. (in Turk).

Photographs..., 2000 – Photographs of the Massacre of Turks by Armenians During World War I, Library of the General Staff Attaché Presidency. Ankara 2000. 81 p. (in Tur).

Saray, 1998 – *Mehmet Saray*. An Analysis of Turkish-Russian Relations. Ministry of National Education Publications. Istanbul 1998. 280 p. (in Turk).

Sarı, 2016 – *Mustafa Sarı*. “The Istanbul Journey of Caucasian Delegates and the Caucasus Front (1918)” *Caucasus Studies-Journal of Social Sciences, Journal of Caucasian Studies (JOCAS)* March 2016. 85 p. (in Tur).

Soylemez, 1949 – *Galip Kemal Soylemez*. Thirty Years in Foreign Service 1892-1922, Volume I. Şaka Printing House, Istanbul 1949. 538 p. (in Turk).

Turkish Revolution..., 1972 – Turkish Revolution History, Institute Publications, Ankara 1972. 362 p. (in Tur).

Turkish War..., 1978 – Turkish War in the First World War, Volume II, Part 2: Caucasus Front, Army Operations 1916-1918. General Staff Printing House, Ankara 1978. 782 p. (in Turk).

Yerasimos, 2000 – *Stefanos Yerasimos*. Turkish-Soviet Relations in the War of Independence 1917-1923, Boyut Publishing Group, Istanbul 2000. 640 p. (in Tur).

Досымова М. К.

Абай атындағы Қазақ ұлттық педагогикалық университеті
mugazimad@gmail.com

БРЕСТ-ЛИТОВСК БІТІМІНІҢ ШЫҒЫС АНАДОЛЫ АЙМАҒЫНДА ІСКЕ АСЫРЫЛУЫ

Аңдатпа. 1918 жылғы 3 наурызда қол қойылған Брест-Литовск бітім шарты Осман империясы мен Кеңестік Ресей арасындағы Бірінші дүниежүзілік соғыстың Кавказ майданын тоқтатқан және тараптар арасындағы жаңа шекаралық межелеулерді айқындаған маңызды дипломатиялық құжат болып табылады. Шарттың ең маңызды баптарының бірі 1877–1878 жылдардағы Осман-Ресей соғысынан кейін қабылданған Берлин шартына сәйкес Ресейге берілген Карс, Ардаган және Батум қалаларын Осман империясына қайтаруды көздеді. Шарттың Шығыс Анадолыдағы жүзеге асырылу үдерісі тек дипломатиялық шекаралық реттеу шеңберімен шектелмей, әскери операциялар, әкімшілік ұйымдастыру және өңір халқын Осман билігіне қайта кіріктіру сияқты көпқырлы үдерістерді қамтыды. 1918 жылдың наурыз–сәуір айларында Осман әскері Кавказ бағытында ілгерілеп, шарт талаптарына сәйкес белгіленген аумақтарға іс жүзінде бақылау орнатты. Осы кезеңде аймақтағы армян халқы арасындағы шиеленістер, көші-қон үдерістері және жергілікті қарсылық әрекеттері де орын алды. Брест-Литовск бітім шартының жүзеге асырылуы Осман империясы үшін әскери әрі саяси жетістік ретінде бағаланғанымен, бұл жетістіктердің тұрақтылығы шектеулі болды.

1918 жылдың соңында Осман империясының Бірінші дүниежүзілік соғыста жеңіліске ұшырауы және Мудрос бітімінің жасалуы нәтижесінде аталған аумақтар қысқа мерзім ішінде қайтадан Осман бақылауынан шықты. Осылайша, Брест-Литовск шартының Шығыс Анадолыдағы жүзеге асырылуы Осман тарихындағы уақытша, бірақ стратегиялық тұрғыдан маңызды кезең ретінде сипатталады.

Кілт сөздер: Брест-Литовск бітім шарты, Үш санжақ (Карс, Ардахан, Батум), Кавказ, Осман империясы, Ресей империясы, армяндар, гректер, Кеңестік Ресей.

Досымова М. К.

Казахский Национальный педагогический университет имени Абая
mugazimad@gmail.com

РЕАЛИЗАЦИЯ БРЕСТ-ЛИТОВСКОГО ДОГОВОРА В ВОСТОЧНОЙ АНАТОЛИИ

Аннотация. Брест-Литовский договор, подписанный 3 марта 1918 года, является важным дипломатическим документом, который положил конец Кавказскому фронту Первой мировой войны между Османской империей и Советской Россией и установил новые пограничные соглашения между сторонами. Одна из наиболее примечательных статей договора предусматривала возвращение Османской империи городов Карс, Ардаган и Батум, которые были уступлены России по Берлинскому договору, подписанному после Русско-турецкой войны 1877-1878 годов. Процесс реализации договора в Восточной Анатолии представлял собой не просто дипломатическое урегулирование границ, но также привел к многомерным событиям, таким как военные операции, административная организация и реинтеграция населения региона под османское правление. В период с марта по апрель 1918 года османская армия продвинулась на Кавказ и фактически заняла территории, определенные в рамках положений договора. В ходе этого процесса напряженность в отношениях с армянским населением региона, миграционные движения и местное сопротивление также были среди значимых событий. Реализация Брест-Литовского договора рассматривалась как военное и политическое достижение для Османской империи, однако долговечность этих достижений была ограниченной. С поражением Османской империи в Первой мировой войне в конце того же года и подписанием Мудросского перемирия указанные регионы вновь быстро вышли из-под османского контроля. Таким образом, реализация Брест-Литовского договора в Восточной Анатолии представляет собой временный, но стратегически важный период в османской истории.

Ключевые слова: Брест-Литовский договор, Три санджака (Карс, Ардахан, Батум), Кавказ, Османская империя, Российская империя, армяне, греки, Советская Россия.

Information about author:

Dosymova Mugazima Kazikhanova, Senior Lecturer, Abai Kazakh National Pedagogical University

Автор туралы мәлімет:

Досымова Мугазима Казихановна, аға оқытушы, Абай атындағы Қазақ ұлттық педагогикалық университеті

Информация об авторе:

Досымова Мугазима Казихановна, старший преподаватель, Казахский национальный педагогический университет имени Абая

Келіп түсті 8 желтоқсан 2025 жыл
Қабылданды 20 қаңтар 2026 жыл