

IRSTI 23.53:23.55

[https://doi.org/ 10.63051/kos.2024.4.101](https://doi.org/10.63051/kos.2024.4.101)

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CHINA'S ETHNIC MINORITY POLICIES IN TIBET AND IMPLICATIONS TO INDIA

Abstract. China's ethnic minority postures mainly exhibited national integration or assimilationist policies in the past seven decades. However, while many of these policies were inherited from the then Soviet Union with modifications to the Chinese reality, there is a subtle change in recent times. Specifically, since Xi Jinping took over as China's leader since 2012, the larger China Dream and China Rejuvenation projects have overshadowed ethnic minority policies including on Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. On August 29, 2020 for instance, the China's apex Tibet Forum Meeting decided to further «sinicize» Tibet and Buddhism into China's fold. It is argued here that China is in the process of revising its national ethnic minority policies inherited from the Soviet Union and attempting at centralisation to bring the ethnic minority regions under the effective control of the party-state ideology. As a result, ethnic minorities in China, specifically Tibetans, Uighurs and Mongols have expressed dissent over the loss of autonomy. These are impacting on the neighbouring countries in Central Asia and South Asia, including on India. This has implications for the trans-Himalayan region's stability, migration patterns, territorial dispute and environmental (specifically water) issues for India and others. The purpose of this article is to analyze the changes in China's policy towards ethnic minorities over the past seventy years, with a particular focus on the impact of political projects such as the «Chinese Dream» and «China Rejuvenation» on the situation of ethnic minorities, including Tibetans, Uyghurs and Mongols. The main focus is on the consequences of these changes for regional stability and interstate relations. The study relies on documentary sources: examining historical archives, official documents and statements of the Chinese government to identify changes in policy towards ethnic minorities. It concludes that the «Chinese Dream» and «China Rejuvenation» projects have come to dominate state policy and have created pressure on ethnic groups seeking to preserve their identity and autonomy.

Keywords: China's ethnic minority policies, national integration, assimilation, Tibet, India

Introduction

Several structural changes are being made to the ethnic policies followed by the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the last over seven decades³ (See Zhou Xing, 2022). In the recent times,

³ At the methodological level, as some said, “terminological chaos” prevails in China on the words and phenomenon of ethnicity, ethnology, “ethnology with Chinese characteristics”, ethnic theory, nation, state, race, minorities, ethnic minorities, ethnic politics, frontiers and other terms. Further, the academic debates in China since 1939 on whether the Chinese nation is a “unified” or “multi-ethnic” - coinciding with the political trends of post Qing dynasty – have also complicated the discipline. For instance, while Liang Qichao proposed building a modern state based on all ethnic groups, the post-1911 Republican period witnessed the “Five Races under One Union” with Han, Manchu, Tibetan, Mongol and Hui Muslims existing under one nation. However, the domestic debates, Marxist theory and Soviet influence created ground for the latter-day coinage of “multi-ethnic nation”. Famous anthropologist Fei Xiaotong argued that while differences exist between different groups in China, they should strive for eradicating “political inequality” rather than the boundaries of all ethnic groups. Fei proposed “Unity of Pluralistic Society of the Chinese Nation”. This paper does not attempt to delve into the methodological issues or definitions. Instead, it focuses on the basic policies adopted by China towards the minorities and the latter's responses in a broader manner.

as China is rising in the international system, it is also trying to consolidate further its hold over the far-flung areas inhabited by the country's 55 ethnic minorities⁴ (Li Jianxin and Liu Mei, 2020). While the Western Development Campaign³ (Jihyeon Jeong, 2011:15-20) and the Belt and Road Initiative have shrunk the space between Han-dominated eastern coastal regions with the minority western regions, at the policy level further Sinicization process is underway to further integrate the ethnic minorities regions into the mainstream of China. In the process, the Soviet Union inspired 1950s ethnic policies on "national minorities" and the 1980s reform and opening up policies oriented towards "economic development" are also undergoing major transformations in China today⁵. Sinicization, as reiterated in China's policies towards Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and other areas since late 2000s, aims to further assimilate the ethnic minorities into the Han-fold in order to realise China's Dream and China's Rejuvenation.

Research Materials and Methods

The study was conducted using documentary sources: historical archives, official documents, and statements by the Chinese government were examined to identify changes in policy towards ethnic minorities. In addition, comparative analysis was used to compare China's policy with approaches used in other countries with multi-ethnic populations. A study was also conducted of media coverage of China's policy towards ethnic minorities both in China and abroad.

The objectives of the article are as follows:

1. To analyze the history of the policy of national integration and assimilation towards ethnic minorities in China from the 1950s to the present day.
2. To study the influence of the Soviet experience on the formation of China's modern policy in this area.

⁴ China's ethnic minorities constitute about 8.4 percent of the population according to the 6th census of 2010. Among these Zhuang, Hui, Manchu, Uyghur, Tibetan and Mongolian account for 15.12%, 9.45%, 9.28%, 8.99%, 5.61% and 5.34% of the ethnic minority population. This is based on Li Jianxin and Liu Mei, "我国少数民族人口现状及变化特点" [The current situation and changing characteristics of China's ethnic minority population] April 1, 2020 at <<https://rcenw.lzu.edu.cn/c/202004/796.html>> According to the previous censuses, the ethnic minorities constituted about 6 percent in 1953, 5.7 percent in 1964, 6.6 percent in 1982, 8 percent in 1990 and 8.4 percent in 2000. It was mentioned that the Uyghur population was 3.61 million in 1953 and exceeded 10 million in 2010, while the Tibetan population was 6.2 million by 2010. On the other hand, for the employment of the Uighurs and Tibetans, while the number of people employed in primary industry is about 80%, those employed in the secondary and tertiary industries is low and growing slowly. More than 80% of the employed population of Uighurs and Tibetans are engaged in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery, and less than 4% of the employed population are engaged in the secondary industry. According to this study, the number of employed people in professional and technical occupations, production and transportation and others is relatively low. The 7th Census of 2021 indicated the proportion of ethnic minority population rising by 0.40 percentage points. See "第七次全国人口普查结果公布! 中国人口共 141178 万人" [The results of the seventh national census are released! China's population is 1411.78 million] May 11, 2021 at <http://www.miluo.gov.cn/28584/60906/60910/60924/content_1815734.html> See also Zheng Qian, 中国民族与宗教 (China's Ethnicity and Religion) (Beijing: China International Publishing House, 2010); Guo Rongxing, China Ethnic Statistical Yearbook 2020 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020) and Dudley L. Poston, Jr. and Jing Shu, "The Demographic and Socioeconomic Composition of China's Ethnic Minorities" Population and Development Review, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Dec., 1987), pp. 703-722

⁵ The leading expert in this area, Ma Rong argued that the adopting the Soviet model in the 1950s by the PRC had its own attendant problems on nation, state and society. Given the recurring problems that the PRC is facing in the minority regions, Ma and others have argued for revisiting the Soviet model and suggested to building a unified state model with far-reaching consequences for the constitutional provisions on "regional autonomy" and others. James Leibold, "Ethnic Policy in China - Is Reform Inevitable?" Policy Studies 68 East-West Center (2013).

3. To consider the changes that have occurred since 2012, after Xi Jinping came to power, and to identify the main national projects influencing this policy.

4. To assess the reactions of ethnic minorities to the loss of autonomy and the formation of a new state ideology. 5. Analyze potential impacts on neighboring countries and regional stability, including territorial disputes and ecosystem challenges.

Discussion

A brief outline of the ethnic policies adopted by China indicates to the CCP's determination to modify, adapt and lead the issue since the establishment of the PRC in 1949⁶. The Common Program of September 1949, the four constitutions of the state had major provisions on the ethnic question in China. The Common Program is considered to be the "social contract" between the CCP and the Chinese people. Article 9 of Common Program states that "All nationalities in the People's Republic of China shall have equal rights and duties". Article 50 stated that "They shall establish unity and mutual aid among themselves, and shall oppose imperialism and their own public enemies". It also suggested to "regional autonomy" to be practiced in the minority regions and the government to "assist the masses of the people of all national minorities to develop their political, economic, cultural and educational construction work." This template was applied to the ethnic minorities in the country. Scores of CCP cadres were sent to the minority regions to explain the new government's policies and also to coopt them into the CCP-led processes. The first issue then was of recognizing the "national minority" status of such groups, which provided a huge leverage to the CCP vis-à-vis the ethnic minorities. Here, the Soviet experience came handy as with the other models that China adopted from the then USSR. Stalin's definition of "national minorities" was applied across the board. Also, with the intervention of Li Wei-han, who suggested to "united front" tactics with the minorities, new policies were set with the launch of patriotic mass associations, "democratic reform movement" and others. While the State Ethnic Affairs Commission under the State Council considered all ethnic minorities issues⁷, the 7th Bureau of the United Front Work Department of the CCP since 2005 looked after the Tibet-related issues (Takashi Suzuki, 2019: 83-98). Constitutional provisions suggest to the protection of the minority nationalities right to retain certain marriage patterns and traditions of conducting one's personal life; the right to engage in various forms of religious practices which are otherwise considered "superstitious"; in the educational, finance, culture and religious spheres. However, the 16-point decisions during the Cultural Revolution were to jettison the "united front" and usher in the movement to eradicate "four olds" (old ideas, culture, customs and habits). This period witnessed thousands of monasteries

⁶ Mullaney argued that while the Qing period considered the ethnic groups as "barbarians" in the far-flung areas such as Yunnan, the subsequent nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek considered them as a single unified "Chinese nation" (中华民族) and suggested to a policy of assimilation of minorities. Earlier, the Manchu rule under the Qing dynasty evoked considerable negative response from the Han nationalists. Dr Sun Yat-sen considered assimilationist policies towards the minorities but was rejected by the provisional assembly in 1912. This changed under the PRC since 1949 under the CCP after the first census was made in 1953-54 when they found more than 400 ethnic minority groups. The CCP settled for the 55 minorities figure. (Mullaney, *ibid*, pp.1-3). Interestingly as well, the November 1931 Constitution of the Soviet Republic stated that "the Chinese Soviet Republic categorically and unconditionally recognizes the right of national minorities to self-determination", specifically for the national minorities of Mongolia, Tibet, Xinjiang, Yunnan, and Guizhou (Mullaney, pp. 26-27). On the Nationalists' position on ethnic issues see Lin Hsiao-ting, *Modern China's Ethnic Frontiers - A journey to the west* (London: Routledge, 2011) and James Leibold, "Positioning "Minzu" Within Sun Yat-Sen's Discourse of Minzuzhuyi" *Journal of Asian History*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2004), pp. 163-213

⁷ Li Wei-han was the first minister of this Commission. The Commission was disbanded in 1966 during the Cultural Revolution but re-emerged in 1988.

destroyed in Tibet, as with mosques and other religious places, in addition to persecution of millions (June Dreyer, 1968:96-109).

The launch of the reform and opening up brought in a new template of modernization. “Freedom of religious belief” was restored in the new constitution in 1982, although political education and countering “unlawful activities” continued. In 1984 China enacted Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law that was amended in 2001. This law allowed for setting up ethnic autonomous regions across the country (Lai Hongyi, 2017:5-13). During Jiang Zemin’s rule, a provision was introduced in 1993 to “actively guiding the adaptation of religion to socialist society”. China’s reform and opening up policies, Western Development Campaign and other investments in the infrastructure projects in the 1990s connecting the peripheries with the mainstream areas have not brought in the desired results for Beijing. On the other hand, a certain hardening of the policies is visible in the last decade on the ethnic issues⁸.

While some of the above policies were practiced before, under the “new era” under Xi Jinping since 2012 a number of changes are coming forth in the ethnic policies of China (Hu Angang and Hu Lianhe, 2011:1-12). The CCP defined the ethnic construct of the country in the form of a “unified multi-ethnic country” [统一的多民族国家] [since 1985] with “regional ethnic autonomy” [民族区域自治] as its basic policy [since the Common Program of 1949]. It envisages “vigorously train ethnic minority cadres, and realize the revolutionization” and “eliminate the inequality between ethnic groups left over from history.” (See Shi Xia). Under Xi, at the altar of the rising nationalism and ideological transformation, the ethnic question is also being seen from a completely different perspective.

In sum, while the CCP documents mention about opposing “Great Han National Chauvinism”, the expansion of the party-state is to create, by default or by design, not only Han domination in the minority areas by population displacement of the locals, but also in economy, culture, educational institutions (through *Putonghua* being made compulsory)⁹ and others. This has the effect of the rise of sub-nationalisms across China and the gradual eruption in tensions since the 1990s. Also, as infrastructure projects increased, an estimated 90 per cent of positions in public life are occupied by Han Chinese in the minority regions. The minorities also complain that the average yearly income of the Uighurs, Tibetans and Mongols amount to about 1/4 to 1/3 of the income of Han Chinese settlers in these areas due to problems related to skills or other privileges. These differentials between the Han and the minorities are also reflected in health indicators (YUSI Ouyang and Per Pinstrup-Andersen, 2012: 1452–1468). These also were combined with religious reprisals and the application of “endangered state security” provisions, mass surveillance and others that suggested to a movement towards alienation and assimilation of minorities (Rohan Gunaratna, Arabinda Acharya, and Wang Pengxin Eds, 2010).

Research Results

Tibet Situation

The above general ethnic policies of China have had a huge impact on Tibet since China’s troops marched into the region in 1950. Official white papers and other publications claim to much

⁸ Masahiro Hoshino argued that the preferential policies adopted by China since 1949 towards the ethnic minorities are no longer valid in the recent times, specifically after the March 2008 political protests by Tibetans and the July 2009 incidents in Urumqi. These policies are traced to the rising discontent of the ethnic minorities due to grievances of population displacements, or other reasons.

⁹ The introduction of *Putonghua* as the main language in the ethnic minority regions – instead of being taught in their local mother tongue – began in 2017 in Xinjiang, 2018 in Tibet and since September 2020 in Inner Mongolia. The latter resulted in massive protests at Tongliao in Inner Mongolia in 2020 and other areas.

progress in Tibet due to Beijing's policies. Traditional Tibet (U-tsang, Kham and Amdo) was 2.5 million sq.km till the 1965 reorganisation into Tibet Autonomous Region, Qinghai and merged into Sichuan and Yunnan provinces. Of the 6.3 million people, 3 million are left in Tibet, with the addition of 7.5 million Hans from the rest of China. This remains one of the main grievances of the Tibetans. In 1959, China abolished the Tibetan government leading to the flight of the Dalai Lama to India (Li Jianglin, 2016). The Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution took an estimated toll of 1 million Tibetans. 6,000 monasteries have been destroyed. The Dalai Lama's Five Point Strasbourg proposals for autonomy were rejected by China. Despite the expansion in investments in Tibet in several infrastructure projects and others, the region remains one of the poorest with the least per capita income despite over seven decades of the CCP control.

There was a window of reconciliation between China and the Tibetan leadership. As Hu Yaobang revised China's policy towards Tibet in the 1970s, this move provided scope for a dialogue with the Tibetan exile government leadership. In 1979, the Dalai Lama's brother Gyalo Thondup visited at the invitation of Deng Xiaoping. The Dalai Lama's speech to the US Congress in September 1987 has the five-point proposals for converting Tibet into a Zone of Peace, a concept that the Chinese leadership earlier proposed to Nepal in the form of a Himalayan region's zone of peace. The Dalai Lama also suggested to respecting human rights, environmental protection, halting Chinese population transfers to Tibet and negotiations with the Chinese leadership. Subsequently, in June 1988, the Dalai Lama unveiled the Strasbourg Proposals. After a brief suspension of talks in 1994, these were resumed in 1998. Nevertheless, China insisted on the Dalai Lama making a statement that Tibet is an inseparable part of China and abandon independence. The Dalai Lama did mention in December 1999 that the Tibetans would be satisfied with self-rule (Michael C. Davis, 2008:227-258). Between 2002 and 2010 Chinese officials held nine rounds of talks with the Dalai Lama's representatives (the 9th in January 2010) (Li Qian, 2008). Since then, talks between the two remain suspended despite a few feelers' visits.

Meanwhile the apex Tibet Work Forum meetings have been laying down plans for consolidation of CCP's rule in Tibet, with the 7th meeting on August 29, 2020 unprecedented in nature with its agenda of sinicisation of Tibet and Buddhism (www.xinhuanet.com , 2020). The first two meetings of the forum were held when Hu Yaobang was the party leader in 1980 and 1984 (Allen Carlson,2004). The 3rd meeting was held on July 20-23, 1994 after the Dalai Lama received the Nobel Peace Prize and the 1989 Lhasa political unrest. At the meeting Jiang Zemin proposed expansion of investments in the infrastructure projects in Tibet and curbing instability (Robert Barnett, 2012). The 4th meeting was held on June 25-27, 2001 and coincided with the Western Development Campaign (Susette Cooke, 2003). The 5th meeting was held in March 2008 in the backdrop of the global and Tibetan protests coinciding with the holding of the Beijing Olympics. The 5th Tibet Work Forum meeting took place on January 18-20, 2010, with a long-term plan for the decade 2010 to 2020 prepared. President Hu Jintao suggested to striking at the "the Dalai clique" and argued for maintaining stability. A few days prior to the meeting, China endorsed the "five adherences", viz., "Insist on adherence to the [CCP's] leadership"; "Insist on adherence to the socialist system"; "Insist on adherence to the system of regional autonomy for minority nationalities"; and "Insist on adherence to a development path with Chinese characteristics and Tibetan traits". The 6th meeting was held in 2015 under Xi Jinping's rule and increasingly statements to usher Tibet into a "new era" began, with emphases on "patriotic education", poverty alleviation programme and others. At the last 7th meeting, President Xi Jinping laid out a "strategy of governing Tibet in the new era" that includes "Sinicization" of Tibetan Buddhism and improving the ability of Chinese Communist Party organizations and members at all levels "to deal with major struggles and prevent major risks." There was considerable emphasis on ensuring "national security" and "ethnic solidarity." According to Xinhua, the following points emerged at this meeting

- Ensure national security and enduring peace and stability, “steadily improve people’s lives,” maintain a good environment, solidify border defense and ensure frontier security
- Focus on safeguarding national unity and strengthening “ethnic solidarity”
- Strengthen the building of leadership teams at all levels, cadre teams and primary-level party organizations in order to improve the capacity to respond to “major struggles” and prevent “major risks”
- Education and guidance should be provided for the public to mobilize their participation in “combating separatist activities,” thus “forging an ironclad shield to safeguard stability”
- “Patriotism” should be incorporated into the whole process of education in all schools
- Tibetan Buddhism should be guided in adapting to socialist society and should be “developed in the Chinese context”
- Build a new modern socialist Tibet that is “united, prosperous, culturally advanced, harmonious and beautiful”
- Offer increasing support to Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai provinces in their Tibet-related work
- Conserve the ecology of the “Qinghai-Tibet Plateau”

Thus, China’s “Sinicization” policies are leading inexorably to centralisation and marginalisation of Tibetans in their own land. Moreover, increase control and national security considerations have enhanced the role of security agencies in Tibet, as with the other minority areas. These have the effect of ushering in assimilation and gradual loss of autonomy in the minority regions.

Implications to India

China’s ethnic policies in Tibet have a major impact on the neighbourhood and especially for India, Nepal, Bhutan and other states. Firstly, in a binding legal format, many of these states have been roped in by China to follow “one China” policies of not only recognising Tibet as a part of China (as in the case of Nepal and India) but in some cases also that Tibet is “an inalienable portion of the PRC” (as in the case of Nepal) or that Tibet “is a historical part of the PRC”. Such a demand positions China on the upper hand in legal warfare domain and Beijing could increase costs on any recalcitrant state. However, as China upped the ante in 2020 on the territorial dispute in the western sector of the border, and also due to China raising the Kashmir issue at the United Nations Security Council in 2019 and 2020, there is a growing demand in India for jettisoning the “one China” policy.

Secondly, due to the repressive policies followed by China in Tibet, hundreds of thousands of Tibetans have migrated to neighbouring states for decades since the flight of the Dalai Lama in 1959 following the failure to implement the 17 Point agreement by China in Tibet. For long, many such refugees have passed through the Kodari road connecting Tibet with Nepal with the Dalai Lama’s office providing for relief and accounting of such refugees. Many Tibetans escape persecution and travel through treacherous routes, often in the night. It is estimated that over 5,000 such refugees arrived in Nepal or Bhutan every year, although such numbers dwindled due to China’s increasingly restrictive policies and para-military and police forays into Nepal. Currently, an estimated 200 to 300 refugees arrive in Nepal. Unlike Nepal, India had followed policies of preserving Tibetan culture and religion and for their social welfare.

Thirdly, modernising trends of China in Tibet reflected in dual use infrastructure projects through Western Development Campaign and currently through Belt and Road Initiative projects. This resulted in the Chinese state’s active and close proximity to the neighbourhood, including with India and other South Asian and Central Asian countries. As the traditional “frontiers” and buffer zones vanished, the state’s outreach intensified in the fragile trans-Himalayan regions with wider consequences.

Fourthly, “modernising” projects of China in Tibet like urbanisation, intense use of water through construction of dams across the Yarlung Zangbo and others have consequences for the fragile environment of the region, reflected in glaciers meltdown, flash floods or other effects. This is of long-term impact, although incidents such as Pareechu dam burst in areas contiguous to Himachal Pradesh, black suit flow in the downstream Brahmaputra River and others show their short-term impact.

Fifthly, in the last decade, Tibetans living abroad have been experimenting with an intensification of a democratic process of electing their representatives. While Nepal places several restrictions on conducting such elections, elsewhere the voter participation has increased substantially, suggesting that democracy is taking roots among the diaspora, including those in India, Bhutan and other places.

Sixthly, the succession to the 15th Dalai Lama issue is expected to take a heavy toll on the Tibetan community living in the trans-Himalayan region and beyond. China had already announced its intention to intervene through a “golden urn” process. China had constructed 624 “well-off society” villages across the Tibetan frontiers, with one-third on the path of the Dalai Lama’s flight in 1959. This indicates that China wants to forestall any untoward incident in Tibet during the 14th to 15th Dalai Lamas transition. The United States had enacted the Tibet Policy Support Act in December 2020 and Tibet Resolve Act in 2024. It is possible to see political escalation between China and the US on this issue in the coming years.

Seventhly, linked to the 15th Dalai Lama succession issue are the following broad possible scenarios that could unfold. While it is hard to predict the exact outcome several years down the line, the following points may be considered:

a. China pushing through the “golden-urn” process of selecting the 15th Dalai Lama. While the larger Tibetan community would oppose such interference in religious affairs by Communist China, this is expected to lead to confusion among Tibetan ranks.

b. stabilising the Tibetan émigré situation by transferring the temporal functions of the Dalai Lama to the Sikyong since 2011, while the Dalai Lama retains his godly “spiritual” duties; The Sikyong (Prime Minister in Exile) is elected by the Tibetans and so it gradually acquires a broad-based legitimacy among the Tibetans.

c. Selecting the “successor” (as the Dalai Lama stated) from a Tibetan hamlet (this scenario will become complicated if the successor is chosen from Tawang, a monastery in Arunachal Pradesh from which the 6th Dalai Lama originated).

d. Selection by Head monks of monasteries from U-tsang, Kham, Amdo (tradition Tibet areas), Mongolia and in the trans-Himalayan region

e. The Dalai Lama anointed Panchen Lama (who is in house arrest in China) and the Karmapa Lama taking additional religious functions

f. Abolishing the institution of the Dalai Lama and instead the Kashag (Parliament-in-exile) is made responsible for the Tibetan affairs (an extension of the scenario (b) above), in addition to creating a three-member Regency by the Kashag.

g.

Conclusion

China’s ethnic policies and governance issues have created a complex web of dynamics. While China’s policy towards minorities is still evolving, two definitive trends in the past more than seven decades is visible – that of national integration and assimilation policies. The latter has been a major influence in China’s policies in the last few years. Specifically, it was decided to usher in “Sinicization” of all aspects of the country, including among minorities, religion, society, education and culture. Such policies have increased centralisation of governance and the gradual marginalisation of minorities and their autonomy. The overall policies adopted since the establishment of the PRC in 1949 – i.e. “multi-ethnic nation” – is thus subjected to the Sinicization

policies with major consequences for not only the traditional autonomy of the ethnic minority regions but also towards a complete reset in the ethnic policies towards complete assimilation. Assimilation is reflected in the party-state persuasion or even forcible implementation of policies towards “standardization” or re-interpretation of religious practices, education, culture or even marriage patterns, re-settlement of Han population and a loss of public positions by the minority communities. The ethnic minority communities, notably the Uighurs, Tibetans and Mongols have resisted such assimilationist policies as reflected in the Urumqi incident in 2009 or Tibetan monks’ protests during the Beijing Olympics or the language protests in Inner Mongolia. A number of such incidents across China, however, only led to further tightening up. While China had accused foreign interference and intensification of ethnic identity issues domestically, the party-state appeared to be in a hurry to complete the process of Sinicization so as to gear the country for the long-term goals of “socialist modernization”. Clearly, such assimilation policies are also having a spill over effect on China’s neighbourhood in South Asia and Central Asia, given the ethnic minorities traditional connections to the periphery. In other words, China’s ethnic policies are also having an increasing influence in the neighbourhood as well.

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ҚЫТАЙДЫҢ ТИБЕТТЕГІ ҰЛТТЫҚ САЯСАТЫ ЖӘНЕ ОНЫҢ ҮНДІСТАНҒА ӘСЕРІ

Аңдатпа. Соңғы жеті онжылдықта Қытайдағы этникалық азшылықтардың жағдайы негізінен ұлттық интеграция және ассимиляция саясатымен белгілі. Айта кететін жайт, бұл саясаттардың көпшілігі Кеңес Одағынан мұраға қалған, бірақ қытайлық өмірге бейімделген. Алайда, соңғы уақытта бұл саясатта өзгерістер болды. Си Цзиньпин 2012 жылы Қытай көшбасшысы қызметіне кіріскеннен бері «Қытай арманы» және «Қытайдың қайта өрлеуі» сияқты ауқымды жобалар Тибет, Шыңжаң және Ішкі Моңғолияны қоса алғанда, этникалық азшылықтарға қатысты саясаттан басым болды. Мысалы, 2020 жылдың 29 тамызында Қытайдың Тибет форумында Тибет пен буддизмді мемлекет шеңберінде одан әрі «қытайландыру» туралы шешім қабылданды. Осылайша, Қытай этникалық азшылықтарға қатысты өзінің ұлттық саясатын қайта қарау процесінде, бұл этникалық азшылық аймақтарын партиялық-мемлекеттік идеологияның бақылауымен орталықтандыруға деген ұмтылыспен бірге жүреді. Осы саясаттың нәтижесінде тибеттіктер, ұйғырлар және моңғолдар сияқты этникалық азшылықтар өздерінің автономиясының жоғалуына наразылықтарын білдірді. Бұл жағдай Орталық және Оңтүстік Азиядағы, соның ішінде Үндістандағы көрші елдерге әсер береді және трансгималай аймағының тұрақтылығына, көші-қон схемаларына, аумақтық дауларға, сондай-ақ экологиялық мәселелерге, әсіресе су ресурстарына әсер етеді. Мақаланың мақсаты – Қытайдың соңғы жетпіс жылдағы этникалық азшылықтарға қатысты саясатындағы өзгерістерді талдау, «Қытай арманы» және «Қытайдың қайта өрлеуі» сияқты саяси жобалардың тибеттіктер, ұйғырлар мен моңғолдар сияқты этникалық азшылықтарға әсер етуіне ерекше назар аудару. Бұл өзгерістердің аймақтың тұрақтылығы мен мемлекетаралық қатынастарға әсеріне назар аударылады. Зерттеуді жүргізу үшін дереккөздердің материалдары пайдаланылды: этникалық азшылықтарға қатысты саясаттағы өзгерістерді анықтау үшін Қытай үкіметінің Тарихи мұрағаттарын, ресми құжаттарын және мәлімдемелерін зерттелді. Қорытындылай келе, «Қытай арманы» және «Қытайдың қайта өрлеуі» жобалары мемлекеттік саясатта үстемдік ете бастағаны, олардың жеке басы мен автономиясын сақтауға тырысатын этникалық топтарға қысым жасағаны анықталды.

Түйін сөздер: Қытайдың этникалық азшылықтарға қатысты саясаты, ұлттық интеграция, ассимиляция, Тибет, Үндістан.

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ПОЛИТИКА КИТАЯ В ОТНОШЕНИИ ЭТНИЧЕСКИХ МЕНЬШИНСТВ В ТИБЕТЕ И ЕЕ ПОСЛЕДСТВИЯ ДЛЯ ИНДИИ

Аннотация. В течение последних семи десятилетий положение этнических меньшинств в Китае в значительной степени определялось политикой национальной интеграции и ассимиляции. Следует отметить, что многие из этих политик были унаследованы от Советского Союза, но адаптированы с учетом китайских реалий. Однако в последнее время наблюдается тонкое изменение в этой политике. С момента вступления Си

Цзиньпина на пост лидера Китая в 2012 году более масштабные проекты, такие как «Китайская мечта» и «Возрождение Китая», стали преобладать над политикой в отношении этнических меньшинств, включая Тибет, Синьцзян и Внутреннюю Монголию. Например, 29 августа 2020 года на Тибетском форуме Китая было принято решение о дальнейшей «китаизации» Тибета и буддизма в рамках государства. Таким образом, Китай находится в процессе пересмотра своей национальной политики в отношении этнических меньшинств, что сопровождается стремлением централизовать регионы этнических меньшинств под контролем партийно-государственной идеологии. В результате этой политики этнические меньшинства, такие как тибетцы, уйгуры и монголы, выразили недовольство по поводу утраты своей автономии. Эта ситуация оказывает влияние на соседние страны в Центральной и Южной Азии, включая Индию, и создает последствия для стабильности трансгималайского региона, миграционных схем, территориальных споров, а также экологических проблем, особенно в области водных ресурсов.

Цель данной статьи заключается в анализе изменений в политике Китая в отношении этнических меньшинств за последние семьдесят лет, с особым акцентом на влияния политических проектов, таких как «Китайская мечта» и «Возрождение Китая», на ситуацию с этническими меньшинствами, включая тибетцев, уйгуров и монголов. Основное внимание уделяется последствиям этих изменений для стабильности региона и межгосударственных отношений. Для проведения исследования использовались материалы документальных источников: изучение исторических архивов, официальных документов и заявлений правительства Китая для выявления изменений в политике в отношении этнических меньшинств. В заключение было выявлено, что проекты «Китайская мечта» и «Возрождение Китая» стали доминировать в государственной политике создали давление на этнические группы, стремящиеся сохранить свою идентичность и автономию.

Ключевые слова: политика Китая в отношении этнических меньшинств, национальная интеграция, ассимиляция, Тибет, Индия.

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